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Special Commentary

Insights from the Army's Drawdowns
Jason W. Warren
Abstract: This article provides five insights extracted from discussions concerning the Army’s long history of drawdowns. Perhaps
the most important take-away is the Army can, and should, use the
current drawdown constructively.

W

ith the termination of the recent campaign in Iraq and the
winnowing of forces in Afghanistan, the US military faces
a drawdown of standing force structure and capabilities.
The policy debate concerning how best to carry out this force reduction, however, lacks proper historical perspective. Twenty-four civilian
historians and military professionals recently offered such a perspective
by focusing on previous drawdowns over the span of American history.
Beginning with a consideration of the cyclical nature of drawdowns
and whether a crisis mentality is warranted in such periods, three major
questions emerged. Was the attempt to preserve military effectiveness
during drawdowns contradictory to traditional American values? Given
the reoccurrence of force reductions in American history, how did the
military best preserve combat capabilities? What was the relationship
between the regular standing Army and militia/National Guard forces,
and how did these reflect broader attitudes towards the military? Insights
from the discussions follow.1

1. The drawdown of American forces has been a cyclical part of
the nation’s military experience.

Whether they allowed colonial forts to fall into disrepair or furloughed hundreds of thousands of battle-hardened Union troops after
the US Civil War, Americans historically have tightened their financial
belts at the conclusion of major conflicts. This attitude reflects traditional
Anglo-American values dating back to the late-Middle Ages in England.
Latent fears of regular armies surfaced before the Revolutionary War
with both the Quartering Act and the Boston Massacre. Americans
carried these attitudes forward into the twenty-first century.
The debate over the US military establishment has never been a
purely rational one with biases inherent in the American cultural framework. Concerns over previous drawdowns have not run counter to
traditional American values, and have not always been justified even
by initial combat effectiveness. For example, the Kennedy/Johnson
administrations reversed conventional drawdowns of the Eisenhower
era in time to create the most competent US Army ever to engage in the
initial battle of any war up to 1965. American forces also met with initial
successes in 2001 and 2003 after a decade of drawdowns, paralleling the
1     The US Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership & Development and the US
Army Heritage & Education Center recently hosted an academic forum on the history of America’s
military reductions after large-scale conflicts. Dr. John Bonin helped formulate the ideas for this
article and assisted in its publication.
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US experience nearly forty years earlier. However, American forces have
not always reconstituted effectively for battle. Significant drawdowns
left the Army unprepared for initial campaigns in the early 1790s against
Native Americans, the War of 1812, the US Civil War, the SpanishAmerican War, both World Wars, and the Korean War. Significantly,
these wars ended in American military victory, indicating the initial risk
of fielding forces based on reduced military infrastructure, though costly
in “first battles,” has often been acceptable in terms of overall strategic
costs. Put differently, US foreign policy and national strategy objectives
often exceeded military means. There was unanimous agreement among
conference participants on this point.

2. Competition between the Regular Army and National
Guard (militia) has always been part of the American military
discourse.

A number of scholars highlighted the historical importance of
this competition. This debate is both rational and irrational as it stems
from Anglo-Americans’ historic preference for “virtuous” militia
over “suspect” standing armies, while overlooking the sometimes
poor initial military performance of militia/National Guard forces. A
serving officer’s presentation detailed how the relationship between
active and reserve components works best in a complementary (but not
interchangeable) arrangement. This complementary nature was largely
evident in Afghanistan and Iraq, which reversed the mutual animosity
that appeared during the Gulf War. American attitudes changed during
the Cold War to consider active component forces as “citizen-soldiers,”
in a manner once reserved only for National Guard/militia forces, thus
the American public conflates the two components. The advent of the
all-volunteer force in 1973 solidified this outlook. Two participants
indicated the importance of reserve components increased with the termination of the draft and the unlikeliness of its reconstitution, as well as
the continuing question of the eligibility of women for selective service.
The apparent irreversibility of the all-volunteer force and the merging of
the active component’s reputation with that of the reserve components
changed the nature of the discourse over the roles and perceptions of
both components.

3. The Army has historically focused on education and professionalization as mitigating factors during drawdowns.

Participants agreed unanimously on this point, and as one historian
from the conference put it, “education is a hedge against uncertainty.”
The early 1800s witnessed the creation of West Point to address performance shortcomings, and the impetus after the War of 1812 was for
a more professional officer corps. In the decades after the Civil War,
Emory Upton and William Tecumseh Sherman attempted doctrinal
and educational reforms. Sherman established Fort Leavenworth as the
Army’s intellectual center during this period. Operational failures in the
Spanish-American War led to the establishment of the US Army War
College in 1901. At the conclusion of World War I, which was followed
by a significant military drawdown, the Army again focused its attention
on educating and broadening the next crop of officers, such as Dwight
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D. Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, and George S. Patton. With only
a skeleton standing army after 1921, leaders emphasized intellectual
preparation and solving complex problems in Army schools instead of
commanding troops. The Army’s culture of the post-1950 era, however,
shifted to emphasize tactical training at the expense of education and
broadening. With a large-standing force to combat communism, leaders
sought troop command and training assignments. The officer corps
de-emphasized broadening and education as a way to achieve high
command. For instance General William Westmoreland, who eventually rose to become Army Chief of Staff after Vietnam, never attended
professional military education. Three scholars argued the military’s
talent-management system, which reflected management principles of
the earlier Industrial Age, has been inadequate. There were few systematic attempts to connect an officer’s education with future assignments.
A number of participants said drawdown periods have often been fertile
ground for “mavericks,” whose theorizing about armor and the integration of other new technologies in the interwar period, paid dividends in
World War II. Similar hypothesizing about the structure of Army forces
during the 1990s laid the basis for the contemporary modular force.

4. Drawdowns have frequently resulted in cuts to headquarters
elements, enabling forces, and niche capabilities that have been
detrimental to future operations.

Four participants discussed headquarters reductions at the conclusions of the World Wars, Vietnam, and the Gulf War, which created gaps
in critical billets. As with Combined Joint Task Force 7 in Iraq, a lack of
a tailored headquarters led to failed operations (and contributed to the
Abu Ghraib incident). After early disasters in North Africa during World
War II, General Eisenhower created the equivalent of a land component
command. The initial crisis in Korea caused General MacArthur to
advocate (successfully) for an increase of Army corps headquarters from
one to eight. At the outbreak of the Gulf War, the Army had reduced
US Army Central (3rd Army) staff to one-quarter capacity, which was
not unusual for the All-Volunteer Force, as General Creighton Abrams
had set the precedent for reducing various Army headquarters in the
post-Vietnam era. This reduction resulted in a much slower build-up
during Operation Desert Shield. Of course, the quantity of headquarters
personnel relates directly to increased missions, as smaller staffs have
been sufficient in peacetime.
Three scholars argued niche capabilities should not fall victim to
drawdowns. Cutting them has created shortcomings, such as failure to
develop an adequate tank corps or submarine fleet during the interwar
years. Maintaining an Army amphibious capability post-1945 proved
critical in Korea and Panama. More recent cuts to enablers such as
logistical units and military police (or placing the majority in the reserve
components) has been fraught with risk. One of the biggest issues for
planners leading up to the Iraq War was a lack of line-haul trucks (rented
mainly from Kuwaitis) to move heavy equipment to assembly areas. This
lack of equipment literally dictated where operations could be conducted
and with what forces. The US capability for power projection through
“setting the theater” relies on such enablers. Traditional allies can offset
capabilities lost during drawdowns. This offset occurred during the
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late-19th and early-20th centuries, for instance, when the British fleet and
merchant marine cooperated with limited US naval forces.
The historic precedence for maintaining brigade combat teams as
the bedrock formation of the Army stems from George Washington’s
Continental Army, which relied on brigades commanded by brigadier
generals in combined arms teams (infantry, artillery, and dragoons). Its
heir, the “Legion” of the early 1790s, also relied on a combined arms
brigade model. Four scholars discussed the cadre and expansible Army
concepts for which the brigade (or its subordinate elements) has often
been the building block. Employing a cadre concept in past eras, the
Army eliminated the lower skill levels, while maintaining a mid-ranking
cadre in the institutional Army that served as leadership in reconstituted
units. Cadre maintained basic leadership and training skills by serving
in training billets. In the 1820s, Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun,
enacted a similar option known as the “expansible Army,” where cutbacks reduced units’ junior-enlisted personnel, while retaining sergeants
and officers. After Vietnam, General Abrams instituted “roundout”
battalions and brigades, in which designated reserve component forces
filled active component formations. There is also precedence for longservice professionals manning more technical functions requiring
extensive experience, such as the War Department bureaus manned by
the Regular Army during the Civil War. One historian noted America’s
transition to an Information-Age economy, but reequipping units would
prove more problematic than in past conflicts.

5. Conventional capabilities have been a better investment over
past drawdowns than technological panaceas and unconventional forces.

A number of scholars noted technical and tactical transformations
have improved tactics and in some cases operations, but “revolutions in
military affairs” have not led directly to victory. Clausewitz maintained
war’s nature is dependent on the interplay of social, political, and military forces, rather than on new technologies and tactics. Changes in the
means of fighting − whether nuclear, cyber, or special operating forces
and airpower − have not altered the relationship of variables fundamental to war. Although Information-Age technology proved critical early
in Afghanistan and Iraq, it was indecisive in both instances. Once Al
Qaeda and Taliban fighters dug elementary fighting positions, special
operations forces required Northern Alliance and US infantry formations to conduct conventional fire and maneuver to dislodge them. In
Iraq, urban conditions and the need to interact with Iraqis during the
population-centric counterinsurgency phase of operations required large
conventional capabilities. Special operations forces are also dependent
on conventional Army force structure, such as rotary-wing, intelligence,
security, medical, logistics, and quick-reaction forces − the very enablers
often ignored during the calculation of forces in planning. Atomic
weapons, prevented a major clash between NATO and the Warsaw Pact,
did nothing to deter war more generally, as Korea, Vietnam, and many
other conflicts demonstrate. Presenters noted the foundational nature of
conventional army capabilities, often in support of joint or allied forces,
during every major conflict.
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These five insights may prove useful to today’s military and political
leaders who face the daunting prospect of reducing US military capabilities. If leaders can take any solace from history, it is that drawdowns have
proven to be a cyclical part of the American military experience, and
as irrational as the debate may become, the US military, especially the
Army, has often rebounded to meet future challenges.

